








State aid, open access and market size: two cases of fith network 
implementation in Dutch municipalities 
 





Eindhoven Centre for Innovation Studies, The Netherlands 
Working Paper 06.09 
 
Department of Technology Management 












 1STATE AID, OPEN ACCESS AND MARKET SIZE: 
TWO CASES OF FTTH NETWORK IMPLEMENTATION IN DUTCH 
MUNICIPALITIES
1
B.M. Sadowski, M. de Rooij en J. Smits 
 
Bert M. Sadowski, Economics of Innovation and Technological Change, Technische 
Universiteit Eindhoven, PO Box 513, 5600 MB Eindhoven, The Netherlands, Tel.: 0031-
(0)40-2472640, Fax.: 0031-(0)40-2474646 E-mail: b.m.sadowski@tm.tue.nl
 
Marc de Rooij, Economics of Innovation and Technological Change, Technische Universiteit 
Eindhoven, PO Box 513, 5600 MB Eindhoven, The Netherlands 
 
Jan Smits, Economics of Innovation and Technological Change, Technische Universiteit 





The discussion on the EU regulatory framework of 2003 in particular on emerging markets 
provides for a new dynamic approach towards investment in next generation broadband 
infrastructure in municipalities. By using the criterion of non-replicable assets, FTTH 
networks in local municipalities can be characterized as a new infrastructure which is aimed 
at providing new services which should be exempted from ex ante regulation. However, to 
justify public investment in these networks in particular in ‘black areas” their compatibility 
with Article 87 of the EC Treaty has to be guaranteed. In this context, the paper uses the 
examples of two FTTH networks in local communities in the Netherlands to show that 
(different) open access agreements are vital but not sufficient to guarantee service 
competition. We show that for small networks public investment in the start up phase of the 
network is required to facilitate a multiple supplier environment.  
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 21   INTRODUCTION 
 
In Europe public intervention to facilitate Fiber-to-the-Home (FTTH) networks in local 
communities has struck the right balance between using the existing regulatory framework 
while at the same complying with European competition law. There seems to be some leeway 
for the implementation of these networks from the regulatory point of view as important 
assumptions of the 2003 Regulatory Framework of the European Union (EU) are currently 
under review. The assumptions that competition will emerge in all parts of the 
telecommunication value chain and will diffuse advanced telecommunication services without 
intervention have been challenged on two grounds: First, the notion of “emerging markets” as 
defined in the EU recommendation on relevant product and service markets
2 does not seem 
sufficient to account for the growth of next generation networks (NGN) (Baake, Kamecke, & 
Wey, 2005). Second, as the scope of the current definition of “universal service obligations”
3 
does include narrowband
4, it does not refer to emerging broadband services (Hencsey, 
Reymond, Riedl, Sanatmato, & Westerhof, 2005). From the competition policy point of view, 
the options of policy makers to invest in these networks are more limited as public 
intervention should not be considered as a case of State Aid, i.e. within the scope of Article 
87(1) EC.   
  In order to characterize options for public intervention to foster these networks, the 
key economic issue has been to assess the extent to which the emerging broadband 
infrastructure has been characterized by non-replicable assets, i.e. assets used by the first 
mover that a new entrant does not intend to replicate. Early research on municipal networks in 
the United States has proposed that FTTH networks have natural monopoly characteristics 
(Banerjee & Sirbu, 2005), but replicability of these networks is refined to fiber local loops in 
urban and suburban areas (Lewin & Williamson, 2005). To verify these results in a European 
context, the first question is to find out which markets produce services using assets which are 
not replicable (and which do not). The second question is if there are functionally equivalent 
assets which are commercially viable and can deliver comparable services to end users 
(Lewin & Williamson, 2005). The third question is to find out whether open access 
specifications can provide an appropriate measure in case of non-replicable assets that is 
compatible with Article 87(1) EC.  
  Within different areas in the Netherlands, a variety of FTTH networks have recently 
been developed even if they do not qualify as regions with less developed infrastructure. 
According to rules of the EU on State Aid, there are three options for public involvement in 
such regions: a) as an investor that invests similar to a private party (“market investor 
principle”); b) if the (local) government invests in the passive infrastructure and opens access 
up to all interested private parties on non-discriminatory terms and c) as the (local) 
government intends to deliver services as part of general economic interest (Hencsey, 
Reymond, Riedl, Sanatmato, & Westerhof, 2005). Some experience has been built up in the 
Netherlands using the first and second option. As in the case of the Amsterdam city net, the 
market investor principle has been followed as it seemed the most transparent option for 
public involvement. Currently the discussion on cases like Nuenen “Ons Net” has been 
                                                 
2 European Commission’s Recommendation on relevant product and service markets (C(2003) 497). 
3 Directive  of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on universal service and users' rights 
relating to electronic communications networks and services (Universal Service Directive), OJ L 108 of 
24.4.2002 
4 However, there has been some discussion on this issue. The current technical definition of universal service 
obligation is, however, a narrowband connection capable of supporting voice and data communications at a 
speed sufficient to access the Internet; typically at or equal to 56kbit/s.  
 3focussed on vertical integrated operators providing infrastructure and services. However, 
different open access scenarios that allow a rapid take off of the network and provide 
incentives for service providers have not been analyzed yet.  
  In the following, we first characterize the relevant European legislation in the area of 
FTTH networks of local communities (see section 2). We then develop the case for non-
replicable assets for FTTH networks by discussing the international experience and theoretical 
developments in the area and show how different open access scenarios can be considered as 
a measure in line within EU competition law (see section 3). Then we discuss our empirical 
findings with respect to replicability of assets of FTTH networks and open access scenarios 
by using empirical data (section 4). We summarize our findings and propose some strategy 
and regulatory conclusions in the final section of this paper (section 5).  
 
2   LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK ON MUNICIPAL FTTH NETWORKS 
 IN  EUROPE 
2.1. The Discussion on the EU Regulatory Framework of 2003 
With the overhaul of the EU regulatory framework starting in 1999 with the publication of the 
Communications Review by the European Commission, a discussion started aimed at 
redefining the balance between incentives to build new networks and to access existing ones. 
As a result, a package of directives was introduced that represent the New Regulatory 
Framework of the EU. Within this framework, the Directive (2002/19/EC) on Access and 
Interconnection was aimed at discussing the conditions under which regulatory intervention 
should occur to the presence of some form of market dominance. It also provided room for 
ex-ante regulation in markets (like for broadband access) that have “transitional problems” as 
a result of technological developments.  
  These markets that were (expected to be) unable to generate effective competition and 
therefore subject to some sort of sector-specific regulation were further specified in European 
Commission’s Recommendation on relevant product and service markets.
5 In order to 
characterize these markets (and services), the Recommendation specified three criteria all of 
which have to be satisfied:  
1.  They should be characterized by “high and non-transitory” structural or legal barriers 
to entry. 
2.  There should be no tendency towards effective competition within a certain time 
horizon. 
3.  The market failure persisting in these markets (and services) cannot be addressed 
based only on the application of competition law. 
Interestingly the Recommendation explicitly referred to the dynamic character of markets and 
required an assessment of a tendency towards competition (Baake, Kamecke, & Wey, 2005).   
  Within the discussion on how emerging markets should be delimited and exempted 
from regulatory intervention, the concept of ‘non-replicable assets’ has been put forward. The 
issue here is whether or not a non-replicable facility represents a high non-transitory entry 
barrier into such market and impedes access for competitors to downstream markets (Lewin & 
Williamson, 2005).  Given the existence of non-replicable assets in a network, a new entrant 
will have no incentives to move up the “latter of investment”
6 (Cave, 2006)  and  invest in 
                                                 
5 (C(2003) 497) 
6  The “latter of investment” characterizes a recent approach in telecommunications regulation in which 
competitors are encouraged progressively to make investments in network assets which are less and less easily 
replicable. 
 4these assets as they attract ex-ante regulation and posing the risk of being shared with 
competitors . 
  Current criteria for regulatory intervention within the EU regulatory framework are 
that only if an operator has significant market power (SMP) in a given market and in the 
relevant downstream markets, the regulatory agency should regulate the market. In addition, 
the operator should have spare capacity available and the facility to which access is being 
mandated should not be replicable. Within the review of regulatory framework of 2003, 
proposals have been put forward to exclude markets from ex ante regulation in which new 
infrastructure provides new form of services and that are not characterized by non-replicable 
assets.  These markets should only be exposed to European competition law.  
2.2. Options for public involvement under EU Competition Law  
Within competition law of the European Union, Article 87 of the EC Treaty characterizes 
relevant legislation with respect to State Aid. Article 87 focuses on state subsidies that distort 
competition in the common market. As Article 87 is under discussion to provide ‘less and 
better aid’ (Kroes), there are important repercussions for public intervention in broadband 
markets. Currently there are three options for public involvement in these markets: a) as an 
investor that invests similar to a private party (“market investor principle”); b) if the (local) 
government invests in the passive infrastructure and opens access up to all interested private 
parties on non-discriminatory terms and c) as the (local) government intends to deliver 
services as part of general economic interest (Hencsey, Reymond, Riedl, Sanatmato, & 
Westerhof, 2005). These different options provide new opportunities for public involvement 
in so-called “’black areas”, areas characterized by high demand that supports a competitive 
supply.
7 The Green Paper on Services of General Economic Interest (SGEI)
8 has been central 
in defining the balance between common service obligations and economic efficiency 
arguments with respect to investment in new telecommunication infrastructure. A number of 
local broadband initiatives by municipalities have recently been approved by the European 
Commission, however, only a few have been implemented as a compensation for a service of 
general economic interest.   
  Six projects in the United Kingdom and one in Spain were approved as State Aid 
compatible with Article 87(3)(c)
9 of the EC Treaty. Regarding the two French projects in the 
department of Pyrénées-Atlantiques and the region of Limousin, the European Commission 
decided that they did not constitute State Aid. The European Commission did not oppose to 
the qualification of this public intervention as a compensation for a service of General 
Economic Interest (SGEI) made by the French Authorities in their notification. 
  In three of the approved projects
10 public funding was granted for the deployment of 
infrastructure, while in the other six
11 the subsidies are given to telecommunications operators 
                                                 
7 The Commission of the EU makes a distinction between 'black areas' with high demand supporting competitive 
supply, 'grey areas' in which the network is controlled by a single operator refusing access to its basic 
infrastructure and 'white areas' with no broadband provision at all. 
8 (COM(2003)270 final) 
9 According to Article 87 (3)(c), aid granted by a Member State or through State resource may be considered to 
be compatible with the common market when the aim of the aid is to facilitate the development of certain 
economic activities or of certain economic areas, where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to 
an extent contrary to the common interest. 
10 Atlas; Pyrénées-Atlantiques; Limousin 
11 Regional Innovative Broadband Support in Wales; Broadband for SMEs in Lincolnshire; Broadband in remote 
and rural areas in Spain; Broadband Business Fund; Broadband in Scotland remote and rural areas; 
 5for the provision of retail services to end-users (either residential, businesses or public 
authorities)
12 (See Appendix B).  
  In general, the discussion on the EU regulatory framework of 2003 in particular on 
emerging markets provides for a new dynamic approach towards investment in next 
generation broadband infrastructure. By using the criterion of non-replicable assets, FTTH 
networks in local municipalities can be characterized as a new infrastructure which is aimed 
at providing new services which should be exempted from ex ante regulation. However, to 
justify public investment in these networks in particular in ‘black areas” their compatibility 
with Article 87 of the EC Treaty has to be guaranteed. Currently the option to consider these 
networks in framework of SGEI has rarely been used.  
 
3   TECHNO-ECONOMIC DEFINITIONS OF OPEN ACCESS TO FTTH 
  NETWORKS IN MUNICIPALITIES 
 
Within the European Union, broadband has grown rapidly and the penetration rate reached in 
2005 11.5 percent of the EU population (almost 53 million lines), up from 7.3 percent in 2004 
(EC, 2005). However, in comparison with the United States and South Asian countries 
Europe is lagging in the diffusion of broadband. This provides a justification for the European 
Commission to consider investment in broadband infrastructure as a priority and within the 
objectives of the Lisbon Agenda.  
  In the Netherlands, a forerunner in broadband diffusion in Europe, the discussion has 
been focused on the issue whether or not broadband markets are characterized by market 
failure (CPB, 2005). However, the discussion has failed to address the qualitative difference 
between the technical and economic characteristics of next (compared to current) generation 
broadband technologies, which requires a dynamic approach towards examining the potential 
of FTTH networks and in particular the high sunk costs associated with the growth of FTTH 
networks (see section 3.1).  
  In order to identify whether integration between different network and service 
functions in FTTH networks is warranted, the analysis has to focus then on which layers of 
the network are characterized by significant economies of scale which might represent non-
replicable bottleneck assets. As there is some agreement that FTTH networks represent at the 
physical network layer significant economies of scale, the question is whether the size of the 
network matters in providing for service competition at the upper layers of the network (see 
section 3.2).  
  In order to compensate for the existence of non-replicable bottleneck assets, current 
regulatory approaches are aimed at imposing open access obligations. These approaches, 
however, insufficiently account for FTTH networks in local municipalities. As a result, a 
                                                 
12 All projects are in underserved areas, either because scarcely populated or because characterized by difficult 
topography. The infrastructure projects consist of the construction of a technologically neutral open access 
network, comprising only passive infrastructure. The infrastructure operators will lease capacity to service 
providers on a transparent and nondiscriminatory manner. They will not be allowed to provide services to final 
users. The infrastructure is built in areas where no other infrastructure exists or where the existing one is not 
opened on appropriate commercial, technical and legal terms. In the projects dealing with provision of services 
to end-users, the public investment to the projects will only be provided to the extent necessary to attain the 
objective of stimulating the use of broadband services within rural and remote areas. In all cases the selection of 
the preferred bidder is done through a public tender procedure. Appropriate pricing of the services is considered 
particularly important in all cases. Broadband services will be offered at conditions and prices consistent with 
those currently provided by providers in other more densely populated areas in the same country. All projects 
were approved in line with the eEurope strategy to make broadband largely available within the EU, recognizing 
the need for public intervention to Cumbria extend as rapidly as possible the coverage of undeserved areas.  
 6large variety of open access scenarios have emerged which represent different options for new 
service providers. 
3.1  FTTH Networks within the Context of Next Generation Networks (NGN) 
In the discussion on next generation broadband infrastructure, a number of definitions have 
been put forward.
13  Within the framework of the ITU Recommendation Y.2001 a number of 
technologies and architectures can be used to deploy next generation broadband infrastructure 
(wired or wireless). To characterize the new quality of next generation networks (NGN), we 
refer to “next generation” as infrastructure that is able to provide triple play services and 
supports symmetrical data rates in excess of 10 Mbps per household.
14  
  The distinction between “next generation” infrastructure and current generation of 
services provided by local cable television or telephone companies is crucial as these 
companies (still) offer broadband data at rates that are typically significantly below 10Mbps 
and do not (generally) support triple play services. Even if we currently observe that these 
carriers intend to upgrade their networks to provide these services and capacities.
15  
  Fiber optic cables are considered as a critical component in next generation 
infrastructure. Even if fiber optic cables are difficult and costly to install, after installation 
they are long-lived. As local fiber facilities can provide very high transmission rates, but 
require high and largely fixed/sunk costs, multiple service providers might opt for shared 
access to local fiber facilities to take advantage of these facilities. The key question for these 
providers is whether (or not) fiber optic cable will have natural monopoly characteristics, 
and/or facilities-based competition at the retail level will remain unsustainable (Lehr, Sirbu, & 
Gillett, 2004).  
  The basic architectures of FTTH networks (point-to-point, active star and passive star) 
differ according to technical characteristics like the amount of deployed fiber, the extent of 
sharing of network resources between users, the complexity of open access and required 
investment. In a point-to-point (also “Home Run”) architecture, a separate fiber is deployed 
from the point of presence (or central office) to each of the subscribers. This requires most 
fiber connections compared to other FTTH architectures, and one OLT (Optical Line 
Termination) port per subscriber. No sharing takes place in the access network beyond the 
point of presence (POP). A point-to-point architecture has the highest possible capacity in the 
access network. In an active star architecture, the amount of fiber is reduced by placing a 
remote node with a shared feeder fiber between the subscribers and the POP. The remote node 
has routing equipment which aggregates traffic from subscribers onto the feeder loop. This 
presents a bottleneck in capacity, the available capacity for all subscribers behind one node is 
limited by the capacity of the feeder loop. In a passive star or Passive Optical Network 
(PON), the remote node as used in the Active Star architecture does not have any powered 
equipment. A passive splitter sends the signal from the feeder loop to each of up to 32 
subscribers. In this architecture, the entire access network is shared between the subscribers, 
indicating a capacity bottleneck. 
                                                 
13 There is no commonly used definition by the European Commission even if there has been some discussion on 
the minimum transmission speed to be included. Therefore we refer to definition provided by the International 
Telecommunication Union in its Recommendation Y.2001 “a packet-based network able to provide services 
including Telecommunication Services and able to make use of multiple broadband, QoS-enabled transport 
technologies and in which service-related functions are independent from underlying transport-related 
technologies.“ The Recommendation has been rather vague with respect to the transmission speed and services 
provided.  
14 We follow in our definition Lehr, et al (2004). 
15 For example, Versatel, a telecommunication company, is since 2005 providing triple play services at ADSL 
2/+ at 20 Mbps. Other companies like BBNed followed rather quickly with similar packages. 
 7  The architectures impose also different investment requirements on infrastructure and 
service providers. For example, a point-to-point network concentrates all equipment at the 
point of presence, which reduces operational cost compared to distributed equipment. 
Furthermore, the aggregation of active components can lead to a lower investment in active 
equipment. An active star architecture is considered to be more cost-effective to build than a 
point-to-point architecture because of the reduction in fiber connections and lower number of 
OLT (optical line termination) ports in the POP. In reality however, construction plans for 
point-to-point and active star networks in a particular area tend to follow similar paths, the 
only reduction in fiber is at the feeder loop. Most installation cost is in trenching and not in 
the cost of fiber itself
16. An active star network adds the cost of placing and equipping remote 
nodes. In practice, how much an active star architecture reduces investment cost (if at all) 
depends on the situation. Operational costs in an active star network are higher compared to a 
point-to-point network because the active equipment is placed at numerous nodes at different 
locations. The PON network uses the same amount of fiber as an active star network, which is 
less than a point-to-point network, but also eliminates the use of active components at 
numerous locations which results in lower operating costs than an active star network. 
However, the sharing in the access network poses a capacity bottleneck and open access may 
prove to be more difficult. All current FTTH networks in the Netherlands are based upon the 
point-to-point architecture, in other parts of the world (including the US and Asia, PON 
networks are used as well).  
   The use of point-to-point fiber also eliminates the need for active outside-plant 
equipment. This is a large advantage in terms of network maintenance and operating costs, in 
contrast to an active star network. The same could be said for a PON network, but a point-to-
point network is technologically superior since no sharing takes place. This makes open 
access exploitation of the network simpler, and provides a higher capacity network. 
3.2  FTTH Networks as Replicable Assets 
In order to examine the extent to which FTTH networks are based on non-replicable 
bottleneck facilities, and/or facilities-based competition at the retail level will remain 
unsustainable we first have to examine whether or not fiber optic local loops represent non-
replicable bottleneck assets. In general, it has been proposed that fiber optic loops can only be 
characterized as non-replicable assets (i.e. if used by a first mover in a way that a new entrant 
would not intend to replicate them) in cases where telecom or CATV companies are not able 
to provide a similar range of services to consumers (Lewin & Williamson, 2005). In the 
Netherlands with a nation-wide high penetration rate of telephony and CATV services (EC, 
2005) this currently seems not to be the case as most households have a fixed telephone and 
cable connection. It can be assumed that ADSL and cable-providers are broadly focused on 
the same large exchanges, therefore many subscribers have access to three independent 
infrastructures up to the exchange (ignoring local loop unbundling) (Cave, 2006).  
  The high population density in Dutch municipalities allows point-to-point fiber to be 
deployed efficiently. Since the trenches to lay fiber have to be dug anyway, and the amount of 
trenching is similar in all network architectures, the incremental costs of the extra fiber 
required for a point-to-point architecture as opposed to a star architecture are small. 
                                                 
16 No aerial deployments exist in the Netherlands, all telecommunications infrastructures are buried. 
 83.3  Techno-Economic Definition of Open Access for FTTH Networks in 
 Municipalities   
Currently, access to the last-mile has been characterized as a technical and economic 
bottleneck. Technically, copper and twisted-pair cable have constrains on bandwidth and on 
services transmitted even if the limits on transmission speed are further and further pushed 
upwards providing options for (light versions of) triple play services. With further upgrading, 
"next generation" networks are no longer considered as a technical bottleneck as they should 
support a whole range of (new) service bundles. These networks can, however, still comprise 
an economic bottleneck, if there are no or a limited number of facilities-based alternative 
access networks. A bottleneck facility provides an essential input for production of some 
service or good as there which there is no economically (or technically) viable alternative 
source of supply. Promoting open access has been related to the incentive of regulatory 
agencies to increase competition in markets characterized by the use of a bottleneck facility. 
  Based on open access, multiple downstream competitors can share a bottleneck facility 
which might provide a critical input for the services these firms intend to supply. Mostly, a 
firm that also competes in downstream markets owns the bottleneck facility. Open access is 
aimed at protecting competition and end-users in downstream markets from potential abuse of 
the market power arising from the monopolization of the essential facilities. Access to a 
bottleneck facility should be (1) non-discriminatory; and (2) priced at economic cost. This 
provides a guarantee in cases in which the bottleneck provider would compete downstream, 
i.e. the provider should be unable to realize a significant competitive advantage due its 
ownership of the bottleneck facility. There have been a wide variety of regulatory options for 
enforcing or promoting open access.
17  
  The terms and conditions for how open access is provided has important implications 
for the industry structure that may arise. There are different ways how open access can 
technically be provided and at which “layers” of the network architecture. The discussion on 
the emerging industry and market structure for FTTH networks has been focused on whether 
parts of these networks represent non-replicable bottleneck assets (de Fontenay, Liebenau, & 
Savin, 2005, Lewin & Williamson, 2005).  Initial studies have found that an optimal long-
term industry structure in FTTH is based on one common infrastructure supplier which has 
natural monopoly characteristics and in which the provision of the network and services 
should not be based on vertical integration (Banerjee & Sirbu, 2005). If vertical integration is 
not required for the network operator to recover its costs and a viable competitive market 
structure for services should emerge, a split between the provision of network and services 
(“wholesale-retail split”) is needed (Banerjee & Sirbu, 2005). However, there are questions 
with respect to the incentives that different (open) access “scenarios” might represent for new 
service providers to enter these new emerging markets.  
                                                 
17 Key elements include at least the following characteristics: a) Regulation of price for wholesale access: The 
absence of regulated wholesale prices will enable bottleneck provider to price at monopoly levels, or provide 
access at a price level that would make wholesale access uneconomic for the alternative provider (e.g., to 
foreclose entry into a market where the bottleneck provider also competes). There are a number of options for 
price regulation ranging from traditional rate of return regulation to price cap to cost based pricing.  The 
regulation may be direct as in the form of traditional utility rate setting cases, or indirect, as in regulatory 
approval of negotiated access agreements; b) Defining the terms and conditions for the provision of access: Here 
the different forms of wholesale access are characterized. At this level in particular regarding layering, the 
choice of how access is provided is critical in influencing the industry structure and the choice of technology that 
is used to provide broadband infrastructure, c) Restriction on the line of business: Here the intention of the 
regulator is to limit the range of activities that the wholesale provider of the bottleneck facilities may provide 
(Lehr, Sirbu, & Gillett, 2004). 
 9  The provision of (open) access at different layers of the networks represents distinctive 
incentives for new service providers. If access is provided at the lowest ‘layer’, municipalities 
only supply conduit and collocation facilities in a way that new competitors have to lay their 
own fiber cables and supply own electronics. Even if this scenario allows the service provider 
the highest degree of flexibility, it also is the most costly scenario. Therefore it might decrease 
the number of alternative service suppliers at these firms might find it uneconomical to 
compete.  
  At a higher layer, a community could opt for open access at the "physical layer".
18 Still 
this would allow alternative service providers to operate with a high degree of flexibility as 
the community could, for example, deploy dark fiber and lease fiber strands to competitive 
providers. In general, the community would provide the physical infrastructure, but would 
leave the active elements and other higher-level service provisioning decisions to the 
providers that could lease these facilities. Unbundling at this layer would reduce the level of 
capital investment for new providers, and especially sunk capital investment and therefore 
reduce barriers to entry in the market.  Based on unbundling at this layer, the community 
would assume responsibility for the longest-lived elements of the local access network: the 
physical outside plant structures and fiber cable facilities. Alternative providers, in contrast, 
would select the active elements of the network that are subject to much more rapid economic 
depreciation (Lehr, Sirbu, & Gillett, 2004). 
   In this case, the municipality should assume important business functions as a 
communications facilities provider like for the installation and maintenance of the fiber 
network and outside structures or conduits. Furthermore, the design and implementation of 
the layer 1 physical network has important technical implications for how higher services are 
provided and require service providers to make substantial complementary facilities-
investments in order to deliver services. The higher are these investments that are potentially 
sunk or co-specialized, the fewer the number of service providers that are likely to be 
supported in the market (Lehr, Sirbu, & Gillett, 2004). 
  With open access at the Data Link layer (layer 2) the infrastructure provider deploys 
both the fiber and the link layer active elements at either end. Service providers are offered a 
basic network service which they can use as a platform for delivering a bundle of retail-level 
services. This can be accomplished using a variety of architectures.
19 Open access can also be 
provided at the network layer (layer 3) in a variety of ways.
20  
                                                 
18 Unbundling at this layer can also occur at the optical layer. Optical layer unbundling is consistent with Passive 
Optical Network (PON) designs. Wholesale services at the optical layer can be found in long haul markets, but 
have yet to be seen in the access market. In local and long-haul transport markets, there are already active 
markets for dark fiber.  
19 In examining the growth of municipal FTTH networks in the United States, Lehr et al (2004) found the 
following architectures: “If the deployed link layer is based on a packet-based architecture such as Ethernet, each 
service provider and its associated customers are assigned to a separate Virtual Local Area Network (VLAN). If 
the operator is providing a link layer service based on Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM), than customers are 
assigned separate Permanent Virtual Circuits (PVCs) which are switched to the designated service provider. This 
is not unlike what happens in DSL networks today when an ILEC provides DSL service on a wholesale basis to 
an unaffiliated ISP via an ATM interface to the ISP. While providing the electronics for lighting the fiber, the 
operator might also provide what is normally viewed as a Layer 1 service: point-to-point circuits, for example 
using Synchronous Optical Network (SONET) Add/Drop Multiplexors (ADMs)” (Lehr, Sirbu, & Gillett, 2004). 
20 For this form of access Lehr et al (2004) found the following technical possibilities: “In Hybrid Fiber-Coax 
(HFC) networks, the cable modem and cable modem termination system support an IP transport layer (i.e. IP 
Layer 3 service) over the cable. Policy based routers, or Multi-Protocol Label Switching (MPLS)-based Virtual 
Private Networks (VPNs) are used to separate traffic going to competing ISPs. This is the technology that allows 
Time Warner cable to provide wholesale service to Earthlink and United as well as to affiliates AOL and Road 
Runner” (Lehr, Sirbu, & Gillett, 2004). 
 104   THE ECONOMICS OF FIBER-TO-THE-HOME NETWORKS:  
  SOME EVIDENCE FROM THE NETHERLANDS 
In the following, we compare two scenarios for FTTH networks of local communities in the 
Netherlands that have been in so-called “black areas” (with a high penetration of cable and 
telephone connections).  They differ with respect to the different open access scenario (layer 3 
in Nuenen and layer 2 in “City”) and the size of the network. As we will show these 
differences are important to characterize possibilities for the emergence of service 
competition and the number of firms that might enter the service market. 
4.1. Methodology  
In order to undertake a techno-economic analysis of FTTH networks in local municipalities, 
the methodology has to take the technical characteristics of the FTTH networks (which are 
important to characterize different access scenarios) and their economic characteristics into 
account. Standard economic analysis (Gasmi, Kennet, Laffont, & Sharkey, 2002, Gasmi, 
Laffont, & Sharkey, 2002) has been useful but limited with respect to calculating the take-off 
of these networks and different scenarios for competitive supply. (For further discussion on 
methodology see Appendix A). 
4.2 The Case of the FTTH Network in Nuenen  
In the Netherlands, the first large-scale community-wide rollout of a FTTH network has taken 
place in Nuenen, a region close to Eindhoven that can be characterized as a “black area”, i.e. 
where high demand supports a competitive supply.  As existing market parties (telecom and 
cable operators) were not interested in building a new network no existing infrastructure could 
be used, the new emerging services are running on a new FTTH infrastructure. The physical 
network structure of the FTTH network Nuenen is shown in Figure 1. It illustrates that within 
a vertically integrated FTTH network structure customer premises equipment (CPE) is part of 
the access network. This is necessary as the CPE has to work with the access router at the 
optical line terminal (OLT). To assure overall functionality the network operator chooses and 
supplied the CPE for the network. 
 
Figure 1: Physical network structure of the FTTH network (‘Nuenen’)  
 
In the network, “OnsNet” functions as a network operator as well as a service provider (see 
Figure 2). Therefore, currently there is a case of vertical integration. In order to provide 
different services, the network includes its own Internet backbone and a TV broadcast 
 11headend. A requirement of the government “Kenniswijk” (Knowledge area) subsidy was that 
the subsidy had to target also services (and not just infrastructure). As an open network, 
OnsNet provides access to other service providers, but they have to arrange their own means 




Figure 2: Network Operator Structure (‘Nuenen’) 
 
The lower three shaded layers show the layers of the access network operated by the network 
operator “OnsNet”, who is providing access to the service provider “OnsNet”. As the figure 
shows, the network offers access to the service provider(s) at network layer 3. The decision 
for a layer 3 system was mainly based on the fact that this provided a complete, integrated 
system which could be used by “OnsNet” to offer services. As no additional equipment was 
needed the integrated layer 3 system was considered as a cheaper option compared to a layer 
2 system. 
  The network is based on a double point-to-point architecture. It connects 7445 homes 
in the Nuenen municipality. A single POP is used to aggregate all connections, and two fibers 
are deployed to each connected house. On one fiber, Internet and telephony services are 
provided; the second fiber is used for RF TV broadcast.
21 The equipment used on the data 
network is an integrated layer 3 system by Swedish vendor PacketFront. The PacketFront 
system
22 is capable of delivering IPTV on the same fiber; however this requires set-top boxes 
for consumers. Due to the high cost of set-top boxes (as subscribers often own multiple 
television sets), the deployment of an additional fiber for normal TV broadcast was 
considered as a cheaper option. In addition, subscribers would then not be deterred by the 
inconvenience of using a set-top box instead of their normal television remote control. A set-
top box is still required for video-on-demand or future digital transmissions over the RF 
broadcast fiber. 
  In a layer 3 system, the network operator has more tasks than in a layer 2 system, 
specifically managing the IP layer.
23 The use of an integrated system essentially reduces the 
                                                 
21 The choice for a second fiber for analogue RTV has been based on considerations with respect to customer 
comfort. End-users can therefore reconnect their TV in a “plug and play” fashion  
22 The PacketFront system is optimized for municipalities (or operators) wishing to provide services themselves, 
while still offering the option of open access for services. The ASR 4000 series access routers have an integrated 
network operation system called ‘BECS’, which makes it an all-in-one solution. 
23 On this subject, PacketFront writes in: “Even though the IP Addresses are owned by the service provider, they 
are handed out (via DHCP) by systems in the Network Operators network and therefore required to be delegated 
to the Network Operator.” And: “the technical requirements put on the service provider are reduced to providing 
a pool of IP addresses and specifying service parameters (Bandwidth, QoS etc). The rest of the delivery is 
handled by the network operators control system.” 
 12service provider offering services like telephony to someone who sends bills; and service 
provisioning by an Internet service provider is stripped several basic tasks as well. Many tasks 
are now performed by the network operator, who takes on a significant amount of system 
management. Experience with the network so far has indicated that in a split network and 
services cost structure, almost all of the operational costs (apart from the costs for 
broadcasting rights and some servers for the Internet services) would be allocated to the 
network operator. 
  With entry conditions for service providers as described above, we characterize scale 
economies for the network operator and service providers in the case of the “Nuenen” 
network. The model assumes both network operator and service providers to be single-
product firms so that the network operator provides only network access. 
  Due to the substantial government subsidy (“Kenniswijk” subsidy), the business case 
in Nuenen is quite different from a ‘normal’ FTTH rollout. Therefore we introduce a first 
distinction between ‘current’ (subsidized) scenario and a ‘normal’ (unsubsidized) scenario. In 
the first scenario, a subsidy of €800 per subscriber was available. In order to maximize the 
benefits from the subsidy, subscribers were offered for a one-year free-of-charge 10 Mbps 
symmetrical Internet service when they signed on, which led to a 97 percent penetration rate 
already within the first year. The advantage of this high penetration rate had also a downside: 
virtually all required active equipment to serve the entire community had to be installed. After 
the first year when subscribers had to pay for access, penetration dropped
24 which also 
rendered part of the installed equipment unnecessary. To calculate the costs in the 
“subsidized” scenario, the real investment figures for the first year were used, since the 
subsidy has to be offset against high costs of pre-installed equipment. For the long-run cost 
calculation however we were interested in years following the first year where penetration can 
vary. 
  The active and the passive network have different payback periods. The costs for the 
active network are relatively high.
25 The subsidy of €800 per subscriber therefore has to be 
spread in our model over the active and passive network. While the amount invested in the 
project can be considered as a form of lump sum payment, €500 from the subsidy went into 
the infrastructure, and €300 into services.
26
  Network equipment has a short depreciation time; we assumed a 5-year depreciation 
period for active equipment. The passive network was assumed by us to have a 25-year 
depreciation period; interest on both was assumed to be 10 percent. Marginal revenue per 
subscriber (remember the service providers sell only the triple-play bundle) is (services and 
network) €50 per month (including VAT). In the ‘normal’ scenario, a network operator would 
not receive the subsidy but also would not pre-install all equipment. In our models we have 
assumed 40 percent of the variable active equipment (access routers, etc.) to be pre-installed, 
more is installed as higher penetration rates are achieved. Pre-installing 40 percent is a 
reasonable assumption because a significant penetration is required to recover large 
investment in the network.  
  The difference between the ‘current’ (subsidized) and the ‘normal’ (unsubsidized) 
scenario is related to the amount of pre-installed equipment and the (government) subsidy into 
the network, otherwise both models do not differ. The ‘normal’ scenario can therefore be 
considered as representative for a FTTH rollout in a small local community, i.e. black (high 
density) area.  
                                                 
24 However it still is above 80 percent.  
25 A €1000 investment in the active network has a higher annual cost than a €1000 investment in the passive 
network. 
26 We have used this as a proxy for dividing the subsidy into €500 for the passive, and €300 for the active 
network. 
 13  The long-run average cost curves for a network operator in the ‘current’ (subsidized) 
and the ‘normal’ (unsubsidized) scenario for the FTTH network Nuenen are shown in 
Figure 3.  
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Figure 3: Long-run average cost curves for a network operator: 
‘Subsidized’ and ‘Normal’ (‘Nuenen’) 
 
The two curves are the long-run average costs per subscriber per month; the horizontal line is 
the limit on revenue per subscriber per month. The figure shows that the LRAC curve is 
decreasing for all possible outputs, which is a characteristic of a natural monopoly. The costs 
for network in the ‘current’ (subsidized) scenario are lower compared to the ‘normal’ 
(unsubsidized) case. The cost difference between these scenarios is growing with penetration 
due to increasing connections per household and the availability of active equipment (in the 
‘subsidized’ scenario) while in the a ‘normal’ operator would have to build and invest more. 
At very low penetration ratios this cost difference is very small due to under-utilized 
investment in household connections and the existence of active equipment in the ‘subsidized’ 
scenario.  
  Service providers can connect to the FTTH network in Nuenen to offer services to 
consumers. Providers incur a fixed cost related to gaining access to the network, and a 
variable cost per subscriber related to the actual provisioning of services.  
  As the network is an all-in-one system that requires no investment in layer 3 
equipment for service providers. While this reduces fixed costs, significant costs are incurred 
nonetheless in the provision of a backbone Internet connection, so scale economies do exist. 
Service providers are assumed to be identical and to have equal market shares for any 
achieved total penetration. The cost curves for service providers are therefore identical.  
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Figure 4: Competitive Entry in the ‘Subsidized’ and ‘Normal’ Scenario (‘Nuenen’) 
 
For an open network with multiple service providers to be successful, the common price for 
the network and the services must be competitive. Under this assumption we assess possible 
market structure and service provider competition in the Nuenen network (see Figure 4).  
  For the network operator to be able to focus solely on wholesale transport and not on 
services, he has to be able to recover his cost plus a reasonable profit margin. Under the 
assumed restriction, this leaves the area between the operator’s LRAC curve and the marginal 
profit line as the possibility space for service providers.  
  The maximum cost curves are therefore the difference between the marginal revenue 
and operator LRAC curves. Any service provider offering services on the network needs to be 
able to offer services below the price of the maximum cost curve. By plotting the LRAC 
curves for multiple providers we can assess at which achieved penetration rate sustainable 
competition between multiple providers is possible. 
  For the current (‘subsidized’) scenario, our analysis shows that a single service 
provider is able to achieve the required scale to deliver services at a competitive price at 
penetration rate between 50 and 55 percent. The two-provider curve is within the range 55 
and 60 percent while the three-provider curve starts at maximum cost range of 60 to 70 
percent penetration. These are the minimum penetration rates required for the service 
providers to be able to recover cost, profits are not yet incorporated (see Figure 4).   
  While the calculations show that the subsidized network in Nuenen could support 
multiple service providers, the ‘normal’ (unsubsidized) scenario is very different. The 
‘normal’ investment scenario in the Nuenen network differs significantly from that of the 
subsidized scenario with very high first year investment in house connections and equipment. 
The LRAC curve for two service providers intersects with the normal maximum cost curve at 
90 percent penetration, which is extremely high. 
  We must conclude that in a ‘normal’ scenario without subsidy, the network in Nuenen 
would not be able to function as an open network. While the network can technically offer 
access to multiple providers, the scale of the network is too small to support multiple service 
providers in sustainable competition. We suspect a minimum efficient scale exists for FTTH 
 15networks to truly function as an open network, and will test this by performing the same 
analysis for a larger city-wide network in the following section. 
4.3. The ‘City’ case 
In the ‘City’ case we use data for a FTTH network for a medium-sized city in The 
Netherlands. This project would pass all houses in the entire city with a fiber network, 
potentially a little under 37000 subscribers. This increment in scale is a step up from the small 
Nuenen network.
27  
  The physical boundaries of the access network in a split network operator/service 
provider industry structure are shown in Figure 5. Equivalent to the Nuenen network, the CPE 
is part of the access network.
28
 
Figure 5: Split network operator/service provider (‘City’) 
 
In Figure 5, the backbone Internet connection is not considered part of the access network, nor 
is the video headend. In this split industry structure, facilities are present the main POP of the 
city to make provisioning of Internet, TV or other services by service providers possible (the 
interconnection point). The providers themselves are responsible for bringing their signal or 
connection to the POP.  Figure 6 shows the functional delineation in the ‘City’ network. The 
figure shows a layer 2 solution for the network operator. The network layer (layer 3) and 
                                                 
27 We expect FTTH networks to start out as small localized networks such as the Nuenen municipality, the 
Tongelre neighborhood in Eindhoven, or the Almere Fiber Pilot in part of the city of Almere. A network 
covering an entire city is a next step in the evolution towards larger (even regional) networks and a mature FTTH 
access market. 
28 In the future it may be preferable to exclude the CPE from the access network from the operator’s point of 
view, and only provide a fiber termination point for an optical network unit. This would reduce cost for the 
operator, while offering options for service providers and consumers. In a mature equipment market with clear 
standards, subscribers could choose the CPE which best suits their needs: some CPEs could be simple and cheap, 
while others could offer more functionality at a higher price. Service providers could also choose to supply their 
subscribers with a CPE upon subscribing to their services. These possibilities are currently already employed in 
the market for ADSL equipment, which is a mature market. Consumers can go to a store and buy an ADSL CPE 
with more options (for instance including a wireless router or a VoIP interface) if they so desire. However, until 
fibre-optic access equipment has reached mass-market availability, the CPE needs to be supplied by the operator 
as part of the access network. 
 
 16services on top of that are the responsibility of independent service providers, not affiliated 
with the network operator. 
 
 
Figure 5: Network operator/service provider structure (‘City’) 
 
The decision for layer 2 equipment in this network is taken from the perspective of the 
network operator as well as that of the service providers. The service providers have their own 
pool of IP addresses for which they are responsible. Should problems occur with one of the 
addresses (for instance spam or viruses are being distributed from one of their IP addresses), 
the owner of the address is responsible for taking action. If the problems are not solved timely 
and adequately larger problems may arise, for instance if e-mail from the entire domain or IP-
range is blacklisted by other providers. This responsibility is taken on by the network operator 
in a layer 3 system, but many service providers may not be willing to relinquish control over 
their addresses. 
  Management of the IP layer is a significant task and becomes more complex as the 
open network model is more successful offering access to more providers and more different 
services for subscribers. While in a simple network each subscribed house may only have a 
single IP address (say for an Internet service). Adding additional services (such as VoIP and 
IPTV) will require several IP addresses per subscriber (assume one IP address for each 
subscribed service) which increases complexity. Furthermore in an open network with 
multiple service providers, they each will have their own pool of IP addresses to give out. A 
subscriber who takes three services, each from a different provider, is a distinct possibility but 
a complex task to manage for the operator. As subscribers sign on for more services and the 
open network is more successful, the operator is faced with an increasingly complex network 
operation environment which increases operational costs. Shifting these tasks to the providers 
therefore lowers system management costs for the operator. 
  The network will pass all 37000 houses in the city in a double point-to-point 
architecture. In the active network, layer 2 equipment from a major vendor will be used on the 
data fibre. The costs of construction and operation of the ‘City’ network will be used to 
evaluate the scale economies for the network operator and service providers of the City 
network.  Only a single cost curve for the network operator will be calculated since no 
subsidy has to be incorporated. All concerned parties are privately owned companies. The 
cost curve for the operator will therefore be calculated like the ‘normal’ scenario in the 
Nuenen case: the basic infrastructure and core active equipment are fixed as well as a 40 
percent pre-installment of the variable active equipment. Variable costs for the passive 
network are obviously fully dependent on penetration since house connections can only be 
made when a subscriber’s address is known. 
 17  The capital requirements are the same as for the Nuenen case: a 5-year depreciation 
period for the active equipment and a 25-year depreciation time for the passive network. 
Interest on both parts of the network is calculated at 10 percent. Marginal revenue for the 
triple-play bundle is €50 per month (including VAT). Service provider profits are not 
calculated.  
  The long run average cost (LRAC) curve for the network operator in shown with 
marginal revenue for the bundle in Figure 7. The slope of the curve is similar to that of the 
‘normal’ operator in Nuenen, however it reaches a lower per-subscriber cost at high 
penetration. This is caused by the larger scale of the network which allows fixed and sunk 
costs to be shared amongst more subscribers. 
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Figure 6: Long run average cost curves (‘Çity’) 
 
Service providers who connect to the ‘city’ network incur higher costs than those in Nuenen. 
Since the network operator offers open access at network layer 2, each service provider will 
have to provide its own layer 3 equipment in addition to the other costs such as a video 
headend or Internet backbone. While a layer 2 network requires more capital investment 
because of the added layer 3 equipment, this provides better allocation of costs and 
responsibilities to specific parties in the value chain and is therefore to be preferred. The 
calculations will show that these added equipment costs are not a problem at sufficient scale. 
  The cost curves for one to three service providers are then calculated (see Figure 7). 
Again, service providers are assumed to be identical and to have equal market shares for a 
given penetration. The common price of the network and the services is critical in determining 
is the open network can compete with existing infrastructures. Using a marginal revenue of 
€50 per subscriber we assess the long-term competitive market structure of the ‘City’ 
network. Assuming the network operator charges according to his cost curve, can multiple 
service providers compete in this environment? The difference between the marginal revenue 
and the operator’s cost per subscriber is the allowed cost for a service provider on this 
network to remain below the marginal revenue limit. The possibility space for service 
providers (the difference between marginal revenue and the operator cost curve) can be 
characterized as the maximal cost for service providers. The LRAC of the service providers 
 18needs to be lower than this maximum cost for the providers to be able to offer services in 
sustainable competition. The LRAC curve shows for a single service provider to cross the 
maximum cost curve at a range between 55 and 60 percent. Two providers can compete at a 
penetration range between 60 and 65 percent, and three providers between 65 and 70 percent.   
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Figure 7: Competitive Entry of Different Providers (‘Çity’) 
 
The conclusions for the ‘City network are significantly different that that of the ‘Nuenen’ 
network. Whereas the ‘normal’ scenario in ‘Nuenen’ could not support multiple service 
providers (only at very high penetration rates), the City network can support multiple 
providers under normal private investment. The fact that service providers are faced with 
increased fixed cost to connect to a layer 2 network does not interfere with the viability of 
offering service on the network. 
  The calculations for the ‘City’ network support that a minimum efficient scale exists 
for a FTTH network to be able to operate as a truly open network. Calculating the exact 
minimum is problematic since building the network is a custom task in every situation. The 
local geography, town layout, population density, type of housing, presence of parks, 
highways, railroads or water, etc. influence network cost and are different in every situation. 
  Results from our open network cost model have shown that the ‘City’ network can 
support multiple service providers under normal private investment. At sufficient penetration, 
the network has sufficient scale to support multiple triple-play service providers in sustainable 
competition. The network operator can focus on providing wholesale access to service 
providers. 
 195   SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION  
 
Our paper has shown that provision of open access to basic infrastructure as required by the 
European Commission according to Article 87 is also applicable for the FTTH networks 
implemented by local communities.  As these networks are based at the wholesale level on 
non-replicable assets, the key issue is whether open access provisions will provide sufficient 
incentives for the growth of the user community and competition at the retail level.  
  We have shown that there are different ways for municipalities to foster FTTH 
networks by complying with European legislation (see section 2). Municipalities can act like 
(private) market investors, provide for open access in these networks or consider their support 
as part of the services in the general economic interest. As the first two routes have already 
been taken in the Netherlands, the third one (already utilized in other European countries) still 
has not been exploited yet.  
  In developing the case for non-replicable assets for FTTH networks, we have shown 
that open access scenarios can be considered as a measure in line within EU competition law 
(see section 3). However, the open access scenarios differ much technologically as access can 
be provided at distinct layers of the FTTH network. The different architectures of FTTH 
networks provide, in addition, more technological options to provide open access.   
  Finally we discussed our empirical findings in the light of the growth of two FTTH 
networks with a small scale (“Nuenen”) and a larger scale (“City”) (section 4). Our general 
conclusion was that without a government subsidy small-scale FTTH networks will be unable 
to sustain service level competition. The counterfactual evidence with respect to larger 
networks (“city”) shows that with large network size government subsidies are not per se 
necessary to guarantee a multiple service environment given open access obligations.    
  Furthermore, we concluded that current EU and national regulation will provide for a 
patchwork of regulations on FTTH networks as there has been no general recommendations 
with respect to the involvement of local communities or the definition of open access (at 
which layer?). The first signs that this patchwork of regulations will find its reflection in a 
patchwork of FTTH networks are already visible in the Netherlands.  
  Our research has been limited as we were examining the growth of just two FTTH 
networks in the Netherlands with very specific technological and economic characteristics. 
Further research has to show to what extent our conclusions with respect to public 
intervention (in line European legislation), network size and the growth of municipal 
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 21APPENDIX A:  METHODOLOGY  
 
Making explicit which costs are caused by which parts of the value chain will allow for 
activity based costing. In a split industry structure, correctly allocating costs to market parties 
is of vital importance. Where (to whom) costs are allocated will have an impact on the 
attractiveness of certain roles in the value chain, and will influence competition (or lack 
thereof) in that part of the value chain (Gasmi, Kennet, Laffont, & Sharkey, 2002, Vogelsang 
& Mitchell, 1997).  
  
Modeling the business environment: Vertical vs. Open 
 
To compare open networks with vertically integrated networks, we compare the cost 
structures of two single-product firms. The first firm is a vertically integrated operator who 
sells a bundle of triple-play services to subscribers. The second firm is a wholesale network 
operator who sells access to the fiber network.  
 
The vertical business model   
The ‘vertical’ business model models the costs and revenue of vertically integrated FTTH 
network. The network provider does not only operate the network, but also offers services to 
its subscribers. In this model, triple-play services are offered to consumers. 
  The costs of the network are capital expenditures (CapEx) from the investment in the 
passive and active infrastructure, and operational expenditures (OpEx) from maintenance and 
operations which have a fixed part fix and a variable part var. In addition to this, costs related 
to service provisioning (SP) are incurred. We will use a two-part cost structure for the service 
provider: a fixed part, related to the costs of gaining access to the FTTH access network 
(putting the services on the network), and a variable part per subscriber. The fixed part 
includes for instance the necessary equipment (TV headend, internet backbone) and the 
variable part includes for instance the per user cost of the broadcasting rights. 
  Capital Expenditure CapEx is split in the Investment I in the active part a and passive 
part p of the network, which are both annualised (using the function “Payment” Pmt) 
according to their respective capital requirements: the rate of return r and n years depreciation 
period. 
  The price at which services are sold to consumers forms the income of the firm. Since 
the network and the services are provided by the same company, this income can be used to 
cover the costs of the network and the services without a specific allocation between the 
sources of costs. 
The open business model  
In an open network business model, subscribers choose to take services from independent 
service providers. The role of the network operator is restricted to operating the FTTH 
network and offering access to it. Our interest in this business model is if an open FTTH 
network can recover cost and if the network can sustain competition at service level. For this 
to happen, three necessary conditions must hold: 
 
1.  The network operator must be able to recover cost. 
2.  The service provider(s) must be able to recover cost. 
3.  The total price for the subscriber must be competitive. 
 
The importance of the first two conditions is trivial, since no operator or service provider will 
invest in a loss-making network. The third condition is also required because service 
 22providers will have to compete with providers on the PSTN and cable networks. If the costs 
of service provisioning are such that a FTTH service provider is much more expensive than a 
PSTN or cable service provider, many consumers will choose a different network. Since the 
bandwidth of a fibre connection cannot be matched by copper networks, a premium price may 
be charged for high-bandwidth services, but not all services require high bandwidth and not 
all consumers may value a fast connection equally high. This means the costs of the network 
and the costs of the services both need to be reasonable. This also indicates why we can 
accept a monopoly position for the network operator. While a monopolist network operator 
could raise prices for service providers, price competition from other networks would cause 
subscribers to choose a different network, which would reduce the operator’s profits. 
  While competition is not explicitly incorporated in this model, it does exist and limits 
the achievable market penetration and price. Obviously, the total cost in the open network is 
the cost for the network operator plus the cost for (any one of) the service provider(s) 
  Service providers are assumed to provide fairly homogeneous products to subscribers. 
Services are reasonably exchangeable between providers, who compete on price, level of 
service, and brand. Service providers incur costs SP in the same way as the services in the 
vertically integrated firm: a fixed part, related to the costs of gaining access to the FTTH 
access network, and a variable part per subscriber. 
  The network operator incurs costs the same way as the network part of the vertically 
integrated firm, but has recover these costs with its own independent income. The network 
operator can choose to charge a fixed network subscription price to consumers (in addition to 
a charge for the service providers), or can choose to charge all costs to the service providers. 
In the latter case, the service providers incorporate the cost of the network in the service price 
for the consumer. 
  Charging service providers for the network cost is fairly straight-forward in a single 
service provider environment, but becomes less attractive when multiple service providers 
offer services to the same subscriber. While this would allow the operator to charge the same 
connection multiple times (to each of the service providers), the subscriber will not appreciate 
having to pay twice for a single fiber. The double network charge a subscriber would incur 
would drive all subscribers to choose all products from the same provider. Economies of 
scope already exist for service providers, since the cost of gaining access to the network 
occurs only once for all services. Adding a possible double network charge is undesirable 
from a competition point of view. Splitting the network cost of a subscriber over multiple 
service providers creates an accounting nightmare and a confusing environment for the 
subscribers. (A subscriber who currently has one service and subscribes to a second from a 
different provider will find the price of the first service has suddenly lowered.) 
  While charging the service providers for the full cost of the network is a possibility, 
this paper will focus on the network subscription scheme as an income source for the 
operator. 
  This is an elegant way to recover the cost of the network, and allows service providers 
to compete on service and price. This choice does not affect the results of the analysis. The 
operator’s costs are the same regardless of the pricing system. Whether the income required to 
recover cost is paid by the service providers or by the subscribers directly is of little 




The model will use quantitative data from a private investor to calculate the cost functions of 
the network scenarios. 
 
 23Investment  
The Capital Expenditures for the network operator are the annualized costs for the active and 
passive network. The two parts of the fibre network have very different lifetimes so the 
distinction is important. Each asset should be annualised according to its own specifications.  
  The equation for CapEx = Pmt(r, n, I) is based on the investment in the network I (for 
both parts of the network). The result is highly dependent in the capital requirements in the 
formula: the rate of return r and the number of payments n. The scenarios in subsequent 
chapters will distinguish between a public or private investment scenario for the passive 
network only. The active network is always exploited by a commercial party. 
 
Network Size 
Size matters. Scale economies exist within a given FTTH network (as penetration increases), 
but additional scale economies exist when networks become larger. Small networks will have 
higher average cost for maintenance and control than large networks. A distinction will be 






 24APPENDIX B:  MUNICIPAL PROJECTS APPROVED BY THE EUROPEAN 
   COMMISSION  (APRIL  2006) 
 
Until now, the following projects are approved by the European Commission as in line with 
current legislation on State Aid. 
Compatible State Aid 
(1)  “Project Atlas” (Broadband infrastructure scheme for business parks): The project 
is aimed at lowering prices of broadband services for commercial users located in 
business parks. It will ensure the widespread availability and use of highspeed 
broadband services at conditions closer to those in areas with a greater density of 
population and businesses. This project will not require building duplicative 
infrastructure in these locations. 
(2)  “Broadband Business Fund” 
(3)  “Broadband in Scotland remote and rural areas” (Provision of end-to-end services) 
(4)  “Broadband for SMEs in Lincolnshire”: Scottish Executive, East Midlands 
Development Agency & sub-regional Strategic partnerships and Lincolnshire 
County Council will provide a subsidy to a telecommunications service provider 
selected by a competitive tender to provide respectively: 1) mass market 
broadband services to businesses and citizens in remote and rural areas in 
Scotland, 2) broadband services to SMEs and residential users in selected counties 
in East Midlands, 3) advanced broadband services to SMEs in the county. The 
selected provider will have a mandatory requirement to provide not only retail, but 
also wholesale access to its network to third party service providers.  
(5)  Regional Innovative Broadband Support in Wales: The Regional Innovative 
Broadband Support scheme aims at supporting the provision of first generation 
broadband services to connect end-users  (households and businesses), at 
conditions and prices similar to urban areas, in the so called “blackspot” areas of 
Wales. These areas are currently not served and there are no plans for coverage in 
the near future. The measure is part of the Broadband Wales Program, which feeds 
into the National Broadband Strategy of the United Kingdom. 
(6)  Broadband in remote and rural areas in Spain: By means of an aid scheme called 
Programa de extensión de la banda ancha en zones rurales y aisladas, Spain aims at 
supporting the provision of broadband services, at conditions and prices similar to 
urban areas, in certain rural and remote areas, which are currently not served and 
where there are no plans for coverage in the near future. The notified measure is 
part of the Spanish National Broadband Strategy. The measure is partly funded by 
structural fund and partly by resources of the Spanish central government The 
Spanish government envisages to cover approximately 203,000 households and 
businesses, at an average cost per user of € 1,000. According to the calculations of 
the authorities, the overall cost for achieving this coverage will be in excess of € 
203m (€ 175m of which in objective 1 regions), of which most is to be borne by 
the selected service providers. 
(7)  “Cumbria Broadband” (Aggregation of demand): Under the Statutory 
responsibility of the North West Development Agency, a contractor would be 
chosen through an open tender procedure for a period of three years for the 
provision of broadband services through Cumbria and parts of North Lancashire. 
Both areas are characterised by mountainous topography and a general lack of 
densely populated villages. 
 
 25Service of General Economic Interest  
(8)  “Haut débit Pyrénées-Atlantiques” 
(9)  “Mise en place d’une infrastructure haut débit sur le territoire de la région 
Limousin The two projects concern the construction and exploitation of a public, 
open access network on the whole department of Pyrénées Atlantiques and in the 
region of Limousin respectively. The network will be made available, under 
transparent, objective and non-discriminatory conditions, to operators wishing to 
provide broadband services to residential users, business and public authorities. In 
both notifications, the French Authorities underlined the fact that the measure 
fulfils the criteria allowing it to be defined as provision of public service, 
according to national law. In addition, the French Authorities qualified the projects 
as services of general economic interest (SGEI) in accordance with Art. 87 of the 
EC Treaty.  
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